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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. A. RUSSELL and MARTELL E. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION, et. al., 
Defendants-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that a lease 
between the parties was terminated, and for certain liquidated 
damages and upon Defendant-Appellants counterclaim for relief 
from the termination and to establish that a certain option 
contained in the lease agreement was still in force even if the 
lease were terminated• 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following reversal of a summary judgment for Plaintiff by 
this Court in Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah 
2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973), a trial on the merits was held and 
judgment was entered for Plaintiffs-Respondents on their complaint 
Supreme Court 
No. 14124 
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except for the $2,500.00 damages and Defendant's counterclaim was 
dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the order entered 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since reference will be made to the Record, the Trial Tran-
script (which has not been incorporated in the Record by numbering 
the pages), Exhibits introduced at trial, and the deposition of 
Robert W. Major, introduced at the trial, reference to the Record 
will be by the designation "R", to the Trial Transcript by "Tr", 
to the Exhibits as "Ex" and to the deposition by "D" with the 
appropriate page number or Exhibit number given* Plaintiffs-
Respondents will be referred to as "Plaintiffs" and Defendant-
Appellant as "Defendant", Two Defendants served and named in the 
case caption below, Major-Blakeney Corporation and Robert W. Major, 
will be referred to by name. 
Plaintiff entered into a "Lease and Purchase Agreement" with 
Major-Blakeney Corporation, Defendant's predecessor, which agree-
ment is dated March 31, 1967. (Ex. 11). Thereafter, on or about 
August 7, 1968, Major-Blakeney Corporation assigned "all of its 
right, title and interest in and to" said lease to Defendant, by 
which assignment Defendant agreed "to faithfully perform" the » 
obligations imposed under the agreement. (Ex. 12). The lease 
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between Plaintiffs and Major-Blakeney Corporation was prepared by 
attorney William Richards who was acting as the attorney for the 
lessee, Major-Blakeney Corporation. (Tr. 40, 130; D. 10, 11). 
Although the lease year ran from March 31, of each year to March 
31, of the succeeding year (commencing with the year 1967), the 
rental payments of $2.50 per acre for approximately 2,000 acres 
was payable on or before the 1st day of November of each year 
commencing with the year 1967 so that the annual rental payment 
did not become due until over half of the rental year had expired. 
The rental due and payable on November 1, 1967, was paid on said 
date. For the next lease period—March 31, 1968, to March 31, 
1969—the rent was paid by a check mailed with a letter dated 
December 5, 1968. (D. 26, 27; Ex. 2). For the following year the 
lease payment was made on or about December 15, 1969. (D. 29; 
Ex. 3). Thereafter, when the rent came due on November 1, 1970, 
(for the period March 31, 1970, to March 31, 1971), no payment 
was made (Tr. 43-45; D. 31) f even though payment was received by 
Defendant from the sublessee in the amount of $7,768.28. (D. 34, 
35; Ex. 4). 
Robert W. Major, who at all times was Defendant's agent 
(D. 36), testified that prior to the end of the calendar year of 
1970, he was aware that Defendant had not paid Plaintiffs (D. 41) 
and that after discussing it with the accountant for the Defendant 
corporation it was decided that Defendant would seek to have the 
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sublessee pay the rental rather than Defendant paying it. (D. 39-
41).. Subsequently, under date of March 3, 1971, the law firm of 
Richards and Richards wrote a letter to Plaintiff E. A. Russell 
stating that "the sublessee through its president, Mr. Robert W. 
Ensign, is being requested to pay you directly in this instance, 
for which my client will credit their account to that extent". 
(D. 47-49; Ex. 6). Thereafter, under date of March 9, 1971, a 
letter was sent to Mr. Major stating that the sublessee "does not 
accept your attempted unilateral assignment to the Russells of any 
override which may be owing in the future. This 'convenient1 
way of attempting to avoid your resposibility to the Russells 
should not impress them any more than it does" the sublessee. 
A copy of this letter was also sent to Defendant's attorney. 
(D. 50; Ex. 7). 
Thereafter, on March 12, 1971, a notice was sent by the lessor 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph VIII of the lease, directed 
to Defendant Park City Utah Corporation in c/o William S. Richards, 
its attorney, advising Defendant of the default in the payment of 
rent and specifying that unless su^h default is corrected "on or 
before 45 days from receipt of this notice, lessor shall consider 
this lease terminated and cancelled". This notice was received by 
Defendant on March 12, 1971. (Ex. 8). The notice of default was 
sent to Defendant in c/o Richards and Richards, attorneys for said 
corporation, at 1610 Walker Bank Building pursuant to the assignmei 
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from Major-Blakeney Corporation to Defendant and further pursuant 
to the notice given by Defendant to Plaintiffs under date of 
December 5, 1968. (Ex. 2, 12). The notice which was sent certi-
fied mail was receipted for Park City Utah Corporation by Lala 
Gallegos at the address indicated on March 12, 1971. (Tr. 36-37, 
130-31; Ex. 8). 
The notice was followed up by a subsequent letter dated March 
29, 1971, sent to Robert W. Major, Jr., with a copy to William S. 
Richards, attorney, in which it was stated that the default "must 
be corrected on or before April 26, 1971, in accordance with the 
terms of the Russell lease". (Ex. 9). 
No attempt was made to correct the default in the lease until 
June 7, 1971, at which time a letter was sent to Plaintiffs' 
attorney enclosing a check in the amount of $4,855.18, which 
represented the principal amount of the rent due the preceding 
November 1, 1970, but without inclusion of any interest. (Ex. 10). 
The only reason given for the failure to pay the lease payment 
due November 1, 19 70, was that Defendant was going to seek to 
have the sublessee pay it because Defendant felt that the sublessee 
owed Defendant various sums of money on account of other transactions 
between the parties. (D. 63-67). Defendant "Park City Utah Corpo-
ration had the money to pay the rent if it had wanted to pay it" 
during the entire period of time. (D. 67). The attempted tender 
of rent on June 7, 1971, was inadequate and insufficient to pay the 
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rent, together with interest which had accrued thereon, or to 
satisfy the terms and conditions of the lease and purchase agree-
ment. (Ex. 25). 
Because of the Defendant1s failure to pay the annual rental 
due and owing November 1, 1970, in the amount of $4,855.20, after 
formal notice given as required by the terms of said lease, said 
lease agreement was terminated, forfeited and cancelled; and on 
June 24, 1971, Plaintiffs filed an action in the District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah, requesting the Court to adjudge and 
determine that said lease and purchase agreement "has been and now 
is terminated and cancelled" and further requesting the Court to 
award Plaintiffs the sum of $2,500.00 damages as provided by 
paragraph VIII of the said agreement". (R. 1, 2). 
Defendants Major-Blakeney Corporation and Robert W. Major 
respectively filed separate motions to quash service of summons 
and to dismiss. (R. 49, 50). Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a 
motion to dismiss without prejudice as to those Defendants (R.169) 
which was granted. (R.182). 
Park City Utah Corporation appeared and defended, counter-
claiming that the tender of June 7, 1971, had kept the lease in 
force. After the reversal of the summary judgment, trial was set 
for December 11, 1974. (R. 200). Don R. Strong, who appeared 
for Defendant in April, 1974, moved at the trial for a continuance 
and to add additional parties, which motions were denied, and to 
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file an amended counterclaim, which had been in the file since 
February, 1972, as a proposed amended counterclaim. (R. 82-86). 
The latter motion was agreed to by Plaintiffs with the stipulation 
that there be no continuance and that Plaintiffs be deemed to 
have denied the amended counterclaim generally. (Tr. 17-20). 
No showing was made by Defendant that it could not have made its 
motion for continuance or its motion to add parties prior to the 
day of trial, although Strong remarked that he hadn't obtained 
the file when he appeared and never did obtain it. (Tr. 23-24). 
With respect to the motion to add parties, the Court inquired of 
counsel for possible grounds (Tr. 26). The trial proceeded. The 
Court filed a memorandum decision thereafter, finding for Plaintiffs 
as to termination of the lease, denying liquidated damages, and 
dismissing Defendant's Amended Counterclaim. This appeal followed. 
• * . • . ' • 
THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT (EXHIBIT 8) SERVED ON DEFENDANT BY 
PLAINTIFFS WAS SUFFICIENT TO COMMENCE THE RUNNING OF THE GRACE 
PERIOD. 
A notice of termination of lease'for non-payment of rent 
should conform to the requirements of the lease. Annot. 31 
ALR 2d 321, 387 (1953). A notice consistent with the contractual 
specifications for notice is sufficient to commence the running of 
a grace period specified by the lease. Swigert vs. Stafford, 
85 Cal. App. 2d 469, 193 P.2d 106 (1948); 58 AM. JUR. 2d, Notice, 
§24; C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §89.5 at n.52-53. 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The contract specifies the form of notice in paragraph VIII 
on page 5 of Exhibit 11 as follows: 
"No default of Lessee in any of the provisions hereof shall 
constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless the 
same shall continue for more than forty-five (45) days after 
written notice to Lessee specifying of what the default con-
sists, and in the event that Lessee fails to correct said 
default within such further time as is reasonably necessary 
to cure the same Lessee shall quit and surrender the premises 
to Lessors.... (Emphasis supplied) 
The contract requires (1) written notice, (2) brought home 
to Lessee, (3) of what the default consists. There are no other 
requirements in the contract applicable to the notice. Plaintiffs' 
notice, Exhibit 8, satisfies fully and strictly the contractual 
requirements. 
Kuiken vs. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 51 N.W.2d 149, 41 A.L.R.2d 
1397 (1952) cited by Defendant as 41 A.L.R.2d 1400 n.25 requires 
that the grace period commence at the time of receipt of the 
notice; the notice in that case was defective in that it specified 
the date of mailing as the commencement of the period. Plaintiffs 
verified the receipt of notice and later advised Defendant of the 
actual date upon which the grace period was to end. (Ex. 9). 
Defendant had a reasonable time more than forty-five days 
after default to cure their default before suit was filed. Notice 
as required by contract was served upon Defendant upon March 12, 
1971. The 45 day period specified by the notice dia not terminate 
until April 26, and this suit was filed June 25, 1971, a full 60 
days later. According to Robert Major, Defendant had the money 
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to pay the rent during this period (D.67). 
Where a contract requires the mere payment of money, a 
reasonable time for payment is short. The court approved a 
twenty-three day period to bring a real estate contract current 
as a matter of law in Pacific Development Company v. Stewart, 
113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948). What is a reasonable time 
is determined by the subject, the situation of the parties and 
the circumstances attending the performance. Clevenger v. 
Potlatch Forests, Inc.# 85 Idaho 193, 377 P.2d 794 (1963). 
Where the subject is the payment of money pursuant to contract, 
promptitude should be required. Reasonable time to pay for 
property delivered under s contract of sale means such prompti-
tude as the circumstances of the case will allow and does not 
mean indulgence in unnecessary delay or in a delay occasioned 
by a vain hope and a fruitless effort to obtain the money from 
a defaulting buyer. Cincinnati Ry. Supply Co. v. Hartlieb, 214 
F.2d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1914); cf. Utah Code Ann. 70A-2-310(a). 
Delay occasioned by efforts to raise funds from third parties 
do not/ therefore, provide justification for an extended 
"reasonable time" under paragraph VIII of the lease (Ex. 8). 
A reasonable time is the time a person of ordinary diligence 
and prudence would use under similar circumstances. Glen Cove 
Marina, Inc., v. Vessel Little Jennie, 269 F. Supp. 877, 879 
(E. D. N* Y. 1967). Time required to build a road or cut 
a stand of timber would be longer than time needed to write and 
deliver a check in making a payment of money, particularly if 
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the payor is a man of prudence and diligence and it is admitted 
that payor has the funds to make the payment and has had them 
for six months. (D. 67-70, Ex. 4). 
Plaintiffs' notice under paragraph VIII of the contract 
stated that Plaintiffs would consider the lease terminated if 
default went beyond 45 days. Despite this provision, Plaintiffs 
waited several more weeks before terminating the lease, thus 
allowing Defendant more than a reasonable time to cure its default. 
In view of the relationship of Defendant with the attorney who 
drafted the lease, who represented Defendant throughout the 
period relevant hereto and who was certainly in a position to 
advise Defendant with respect to its duties under the contract, > 
Defendant is in no position to claim prejudice because Plaintiffs 
insisted on the 45 day provision in the notice. Cf. Andreason vs. 
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); cf. Drey vs. Doyle, 
99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889). (Defendants waived the defect, if 
any, in the notice by their attempted tender of June 7, 1971). 
• I I • 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT RELIEF FROM THE 
TERMINATION OF THE LEASE. 
Relief from forfeiture of a lease is an equitable remedy. 
"All arrears of rent, interest, and costs must be paid or tendered" 
Sheets vs. Selden, 7 Wall (74 U. S.) 416, 421 (1869). The peti-
tioner for such relief must show good faith. In Sheets, the Court 
denied relief because— 
"The spirit manifested by the appellant throughout the 
litigation, as disclosed by the bill, is not persuasive 
to such a tribunal [Court of equity] to lend him its aid". 
7 Wall (74 U. S.) at 425. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Defendant has satisfied neither of these criteria. The 
June 7, 1971, tender by Defendant was insufficient in failing to 
provide interest (74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender §22,23), and no good faith 
was shown by Defendant, which claims it had the money to pay all 
along, even though this story changed at trial. The second tender, 
after the summary judgment, is not in issue here, not having been 
raised at trial by pleading or even by argument. But even if it 
were properly before the Court, it would be insufficient for failure 
to include all arrears of rent, for by then a second lease year 
had passed. 
The trial Court found that the tender of June 7, 1971, was 
insufficient and that Defendant had no justifiable excuse for 
failure to pay the rent during the 45 day grace period (R. 219). 
With respect to those findings, the principle announced in Pagano 
vs. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah, 1975) should apply: 
"In determining whether the evidence meets this standard, 
in equity cases such as this is, this court may review the 
facts. However, it has long been established and reiterated 
by this court in numerous cases that due to the advantaged 
position of the trial court we will review its findings and 
judgments with considerable indulgence, and will not disagree 
with and upset them unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied the 
law applicable thereto". (footnotes omitted) 
539 P.2d at 454 
In the case of Groendycke vs. Ellis, 205 Kan. 545, 470 P.2d 
832, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that although the court may 
grant relief from a forfeiture for non payment of rent, it will 
not do so where the failure to pay is wilful, calculated or 
•11-
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I 
persistent or under circumstances negating exercise of good faith. 
If ever there was a case of wilful, calculated and persistent 
refusal to conform to the conditions of the lease, it is this one. 
- : • ; • . , ; ; : . • • / • ' • ' • v : , f , . • . ' • : ' • • • ' . . . • ' ; m 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE "REDEMPTION AND RESTORATION 
PROVISIONS" OF SECTION 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, AS AMENDED. , 
A casual glance at Section 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, as amended, 
demonstrates that this statute has no application here. First of 
all, it reads "when the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer". 
Obviously this is not an action for unlawful detainer. | 
Further, the statute does not apply even in unlawful detainer 
actions unless the lease "has not by its terms expired". By the 
terms of this lease, it has terminated by forfeiture where the 
rent has not been paid as required. 
In Baker vs. Lehrer, 210 Or. 635, 312 P.2d 1072, the court 
held that where the rent was tendered by a tenant 26 days after the 
time reserved in the lease and 16 days after the statutory grace 
period for paying the rent, there was a forfeiture for non payment 
of the rent even though payment was tendered before forfeiture 
was actually declared by the landlord. 
We also point out that at the time judgment was rendered in 
this case (March 17, 1972) another rental year had gone by; and if 
the action were one to enforce payment of rent, the judgment would 
have included not only the obligation to pay the rent for the 
year 1970-71, but also the rental year 1971-72, which amount would 
•12-
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have approximated $10,000.00, including interest and costs. At 
no time did Defendant tender into court the amount which would 
have accrued under the lease to the date of judgment. In this 
connection, the decision of this Court in Commercial Block Realty 
Company vs. Merchant's Protective Association, 71 Utah 505, 
267 Pac. 1009, is pertinent. There the court held that if the 
tender of rent is insufficient in amount, it constitutes no 
tender at all, 
IV 
PLAINTIFFS' RELETTING THE LEASED PROPERTY AFTER TERMINATION 
OF THE LEASE DOES NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME HEREIN. 
After declaring a forfeiture of the lease in suit, Plaintiffs 
relet the property (Ex. 26). Negotiation for the new lease began 
after the filing of this suit. (Tr. 82). Defendant cites 
Senter vs. Propst, 197 So. 100 (Miss. 1940) to support its claim 
that the reletting was a waiver of Plaintiffs rights. In Senter, 
however, there was no notice given of forfeiture and no demand for 
payment of rent. The subtenant in Senter participated in the decision 
to declare a forfeiture. Furthermore, the owner had failed to 
demand the rent for six (6) years either in person or by agent. 
And the pleadings in Senter specifically raised the issue of 
fraud. None of these facts are found in the case at bar. 
Defendant had ample opportunity at the trial to press its 
claim under the Senter case. Twice counsel for Defendant stated 
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in response to questions from the court that Defendant's claim 
was not based on fraud. (Tr. 66, 115). 
Even before the notice of forfeiture, the Defendant had 
notice that their subtenants, Ski Park City West, intended to 
contact Plaintiffs if the rent was not paid, to protect their 
interest in the land. (Ex. 7). Plaintiffs diligently tried to 
collect the unpaid rent (Tr. 44) and had not waived timely pay-
ment. (Tr. 42, 67; Ex. 1, 2, 3). See Miller Dairy Products Co. 
vs. Puryear, 310 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958). Defendant was fully 
aware of the role of Arthur H. Nielsen as counsel for Russells and 
for Ski Park City West from March 12, 1970, on and has no basis 
to complain of that. (Ex. 7, 8; Tr. 92). 
And the argument that Plaintiffs obtained a more lucrative 
lease after forfeiture fails to account for the fact that Plaintiffs 
obtained no rental whatever for their property from March 31, 1970, 
to June 30, 1971, a period of 1 1/4 years. 
The court below found that Defendant failed to prove impro-
priety in the relationship between Plaintiffs and Ski Park City 
West or otherwise establish its claim under the second count of 
the amended counterclaim. (R. 219). Defendant moved for a 
continuance and to join other parties at the time of trial, 
presumably to develop this portion of its case, which motions 
were denied, no showing having been made that said motions could 
not have been made prior to trail. 
-14-
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V 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE IN THE LEASE IS NOT SEVERABLE• 
There are two options expressed in the 1967 lease, (Ex. 11) 
one of which was exercised and for which full payment has been 
received (Tr. 49-50). The second option, in paragraph VII of 
the lease, recites no separate consideration and none was given 
for it. (Tr. 41, 51-52). Termination of a lease terminates an 
option founded on a consideration not divisible from the lease 
consideration. Annot., Termination of Lease as Termination of 
Option to Purchase Therein Contained, 10 A.L.R.2d 884, 887-88 
(1950). See Shoemaker vs. Pioneer Investments, 14 Utah 2d 250, 
381 P.2d 735 (1963). 
The consideration recited in paragraph VI of the lease 
was to apply on the first option, if exercised--
"As a further consideration for the above option, and other 
privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and in addition 
to the other covenants and conditions contained in this 
Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith deposits with Lessors 
the sum of $1,000.00 cash to apply on the purchase price of 
the first property to be acquired by Lessee hereunder. In 
the event Lessee does not exercise any of its rights to 
purchase land prior to November 16, 1967, it is expressly 
understood and agreed between Lessors and Lessee that the 
said $1,000.00 shall be applied to the lease payments, as 
above set forth, for the period March 31, 1967 through 
March 31, 1968". (Ex.11, page 4) (Emphasis added). 
(The official copy of this Exhibit has apparently been altered by 
the Defendant, since the xerographic copy bears recording marks 
and Plaintiffs1 copy does not show the pencilled-in changes). 
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Defendant's citation of Falkenstein vs. Popper, 183 P.2d 
707 (Cal. App. 1947) is erroneous. That case states— 
"Moreover, the weight of authority holds that the use of 
such words as "first privilege", "first right", etc., 
do not give the lessee an absolute right to purchase or 
renew a lease". 183 P.2d at 709 
The court below found against Defendant as to severability 
and should be sustained. 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING LAST-MINUTE 
MOTIONS FOR A CONTINUANCE OR JOINDER. 
The court has power, within its discretion to add parties 
at any stage of the action. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 21. 
That discretion is subject, however, to Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 1, and 20(b), which provide in pertinent part— 
"These rules.... shall be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action". Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1. 
"The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from 
being embarrassed, delayed or put to expense by the inclusion 
of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts 
no claim against him...." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 20(b). 
The record shows that Mr. Strong had ample time in which to 
pursue the matters raised in his motion for joinder and for con-
tinuance prior to trail. Nothing was done form April to late 
November, 1974, while he was counsel of record. Court and counsel 
for Plaintiff generously acceded to Mr. Strong's wish to file 
his amended counterclaim, although leave to file it had never been 
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obtained since the reversal of summary judgment, Mr. Strong was 
not surprised, Bairas vs. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 
(1962), and if he was it was only because of his lack of diligence 
which the trial court did not excuse. 
Plaintiffs were not obliged by Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7 to 
join Defendant's subtenant herein, because this is not an unlawful 
detainer action. And Plaintiff sought no declaratory relief 
against Defendant's subtenant. A subtenant not in default need not 
be joined in forfeirture action. Telegraph Ave. Corp. vs. Raentsch, 
269 P. 1109, 1111 (Cal. App. 1928). 
Defendant complains that the recorded judgment interferes with 
conveyances of land earlier made by Defendants. A record of 
closing and a policy of insurance showing title in the grantees 
is in the official file. (Ex. 13, 14). (Ex. 13, 14, and 15, 
have apparently been altered with red pencil). Presumably the 
warranty deeds running from Plaintiffs to the grantees (Ex. 13, 
and 14) will transfer after-acquired title and otherwise protect 
the grantees. Furthermore, neither grantee is a party to the 
judgment. (Ex. 14). 
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SUMMARY 
The Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Bruce Findlay 
NIELSON, CONDER, HENRIOD & GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
SERVED the foregoing BRIEF this day of December, 1975, 
by mailing two copies, postage prepaid, to 
DON R. STRONG, Esq. 
197 South Main Street 
Springville, Utah 84663. 
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